General Assembly resolution on Arafat

(by albert on 09/21/2003)

The General Assembly debate resulted in almost unanimous support for more or less the same resolution that the US vetoed in the Security Council. Apart from the US and Israel the only opposition was from 2 other US dependencies (both Pacific island micro-states).

Abstentions were:

Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, Nauru, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Tonga, Tuvalu.

Interestingly this time Britain, Bulgaria and Germany all voted in favor.

Curiouser and curiouser!

PS I'll try to respond to Patrick's comments (in a later thread) soon.

RE Arafat Posturing

by Albert on 00/29/2003

P: I was not at all surprised that the Bush executive ordered a veto at the UN, and I do not think that this is because something dramatic is imminent re the occupation. I think that the answer is more than likely internal US political requirements, and I think the same applies to the Blair ordered abstention. Blair and Bush do not need even more hostile internal media between now and their respective elections and the pro-Zionist lobby controls a healthy chunk of media recourses. (The current Singleton, Carr spat in NSW over pokies revenue is more like how the real world political forces are election driven.)

AL:The reason being "internal US political requirements" does not necessarily contradict my suggestion that something big is brewing such as serious dismantlement of settlements and/or introduction of international peacekeepers. The point is that any such "big" step (which cannot be avoided at some point, whether or not it is imminent) will reflect a massive defeat of the whole basis of Israeli policy for decades and hence also of US policy for backing Israel. Internal US political requirements indicate some extravagent symbolic gestures in support of Israel to disorient the inevitable zionist backlash about that.

Apart from that consideration I see no internal US political benefit from extravagent symbolic gestures that are unpopular with far more people than would be impressed by them. It is both the extravagence and the symbolic nature of the gesture that marks it as being about something else. When the US is acting in support of Israeli interests it makes symbolic gestures towards the Palestinians (eg Clinton shaking hands with Arafat). When it is acting against Israeli interests it makes symbolic gestures against the Paletinians (eg Bush denouncing Arafat). That is elementary.

With reference to  your quote from me: "The operative paragraphs of the resolution were completely uncontroversial:"

"As is the notion that Zionism is racism, Sharon a war criminal, the wall, and the settlements abominations ...etc."...

 You are treating the term "uncontroversial" as though it was a synonym for "correct". It isn't. The notions you list are all "controversial" simply because there is heated disagreement about them. The actual terms of the resolution vetoed by the US are not notions that the US actually disagrees with - hence my correct use of the term "uncontroversial".

P: Yet despite this wide spread knowledge, the Bush and Blair ruling elite (which I accept have decided to ‘drain the swamp’) are moving at a pace such that Abbas had to resign because he had nothing to show. This is not in the plan, and reflects badly on Bush’s ability to bring Sharon to heal.

AL:There are bound to be hiccups along the way. The details are unpredictable but the general direction is clear. Zionist domination of US middle east policy was an aberration tolerated before 9-11 but is not something that any US leadership could continue to put up with after reviewing the consequences of their previous middle east policy. Israel is a US dependency and the zionist lobby has no magic powers that enable it to overide vital US "national interests" when those issues are clear.

 With reference to your quote from me:  "In fact of course, everybody rejected the Israeli position and in particular the US made it clear that Israel would not be permitted to carry out its ‘decision’ - which of course the Israeli government knew would be the case before announcing it.’ and your comment on it:

P: Actually, the Bush administration did no such thing, but rather would not sanction the action at this stage at any rate. Bush is making a number of speeches explaining that Arafat thwarted Abbas and therefore he is the problem. This is objectively preparing public opinion for accepting an Israeli Defense Force (IDF), military action to kill him if it was to ‘unfortunately’ happen during the next year or so.

AL: Preparing public opinion for something by mobilizing public opinion against it is an odd strategy (though one I have noticed you falling for on some occasions ;-) So far the "preparation of public opinion" has resulted in almost unanimous opposition from around the world.

I see no reason to believe the Israeli government actually wants to kill Arafat anyway. Why should they? What problem would it solve for them?

Indeed if he had a heart attack it would be a problem for them as they would not be able to keep straining at the leash to kill him and blaming him for everything they don't like.

The first major speech by Bush against Arafat was also the speech Arafat said was "positive" (where Bush mentioned almost in passing that the US now supported a Palestinian state). Apart from distracting attention from the enormous retreat in US policy, a major effect of the denunciations of Arafat has been of course to rally Palestinians around him at a time when he has been losing support.

P: No ‘swamp clearing’ movement on this front seems likely to me during the next year, given US election time tables, rather than something dramatic being ‘imminent’. I think Sharon is as die hard, as Saddam, so despite the progress of history and all that, he is more like John Maynard Keynes who answered a semi rhetorical question that this policy does not work in the long run by saying ‘in the long run sir we are all dead!’

AL: Sharon is a fascist more like Franco (who had the sense to remain neutral during the second world war) than like Saddam (who blundered spectacularly on numerous occasions).

The resistance and obstruction that Sharon is putting up is consistent with seeking to strengthen Israel's position in a final settlement (get more of Jerusalem and border areas, less "right of return" etc).

Intransigence and delay cannot avoid the necessity to evacuate most of the west bank and the whole of the gaza strip but is more or less inevitable as part of the preparations for a final settlement.

Such resistance and hiccups were fully expected and nothing unexpected has happened recently (on either side). Nor can sabotage from Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Al Aqsa brigades be regarded as unexpected. If Bush did not intend to press on in the face of such obstacles and achieve something before the next election it was extremely stupid of him to publicly commit his personal prestige to do doing so.

P: With the current war in Iraq costing a US soldier per day in a situation where the US domestic opposition is opportunistically using this and making progress in swinging the vote behind themselves. Bush has an eye more than one year out, and knows better than most that there will still be US troops dying. So, rather than spread the problem, he has to let the Palestinians cop this shit for another year. The Democrats are good supporters of Israel and will not criticize, while vetoing a perfectly reasonable UN motion.

AL: Bush needs more international support and the Palestinian situation is an immediate obstacle to that (as well as a central issue for the long term strategy of draining the swamps and depriving terrorists of popular support and recruits). It looks like adoption of an Iraqi constitution and elections that would lead US voters to expect an early exit have been synchronized with the US election campaign and I would expect major progress over Palestine that would be welcomed by most US voters (whatever the zionists say) are also being synchronized for that.

You quoted me: "Israel is now completely dependent on the US, both militarily and economically and cannot defy explicit US directives.’" and then went on to say : This ultimately may, be so, but if you mean that Bush can’t be defied when he is so vulnerable then I would disagree. If the two US parties were at one and determined not to take crap from Sharon, things would be different but they are not ‘as one’ and so, can, and will be played off.

AL: If the zionists and/or democrats launch a campaign about how Bush is an Israel hating, Arab loving naif soft on terrorism they are going to have an uphill job!

 With reference to your quote from me:  ‘Clearly Israel was just posturing. If they had been serious about it they would have just done it, not "decided" to do it. The point is that their policy is in such a complete impasse that all they can do is throw tantrums.’ .....

You remarked:  "this is another way of saying that they are behaving insanely, and is no way to make an analysis any more than the anti-war accusations of policy insanity of Bush and Howard and Blair.

But posturing (and throwing tantrums) isn't necessarily insane - especially when your policy is in an impasse. It can be good for morale and as a distraction.

P: They have made the unthinkable, thinkable, and, are creating public opinion. Who knows what may happen that will permit them to take the action or escalate further. When such rats are trapped, as they strategically are, I would expect more of the unexpected than any rational surrender and back down from their failed settlement, facts on the ground policy of expanding Israel.

AL: Similar thinking led many to believe the US would not get out of Vietnam. Israel simply has no choice but to get out of the West Bank and Gaza - just as it had to get out of Lebanon. The terms on which it does so are still not final so there is still a struggle. It is of course true that there can be all sorts of unexpected developments in that struggle. Nevertheless extravagent symbolic gestures in one direction are usually a precursor to actual movement in another direction.

You quoted me:  ‘Contrary to my initial expectation, the US actually wants to be seen as taking a lone stand in support of Israel despite the additional resentment this stirs up against the US.’  And then responded by sayimg: US wants nothing. The US ruling class does not firmly and widely know what is going on, and the ruling elite in power is divided from the Bush executive, who are off on what is argued is a dangerously de-stabilizing revolutionary path.

 I am using the term "U.S" as a shorthand for the Bush administration leadership. I agree that it is an unusually isolated leadership relying on a very small handful actually familiar with current policy and without much support in the wider foreign policy establishment. That makes byzantine and machiavellian tactics even more necessary than usual.

P: As to what should be going on, alternative opposition is there in abundance. This is not as if an unchallengeable Roosevelt is in power, as per WW2. The country is as yet not rock solid because the skepticism is still huge, and the WMD justification has been a complete yet IMV unavoidable disaster. I think it may well get worse judging by Bush’s position.

Everybody expected that some WMD would be found including, you and me. We are all genuinely surprised including Blair and Bush.

AL: That is a bit misleading. I expected that some WMD would be found because otherwise the total focus on WMDs would blow up in their faces (as it has). I still don't know whether Bush and Blair were mistakenly expecting they would be found (as you claim in the next paragraph) or whether they simply had no other way to get authorization for the war (as hinted at in your following paragraph).

My view was always that the WMD argument was essentially irrelevant because  the real strategic reason for the war was to "drain the swamps".

P: The logic of exposing WMD, and just quickly moving on in the face of a UN that would not bring a halt to Saddam’s deceit was overwhelming. So that was always going to be the call, because everyone believed that they would be found.

AL: I believed that the extraordinary US arrogance towards the UN was inexplicable unless they expected WMDs to be found before the war. In that case the Security Council certainly would have brought "a halt to Saddam's deceit" (rather than refusing to do so as you suggest). Also the peace movement would have collapsed as it had fallen into the trap of demanding "more time for inspections".

As it turned out, it seems there were no WMDs so it was not possible for them to be found. Either the US discovered their intelligence was faulty too late to adopt a different approach or they deliberately put themselves in the embarassing situation they now find themselves in because there was no other way around the opposition to a revolutionary war from the majority of the US foreign policy establishment.

In any case the decision to go to war was for strategic reasons that had more to do with its "doability" as a starting point for "draining the swamps" than with WMDs. Something had to be done about Iraq with the collapse of sanctions and future likelihood of civil war in the event of Saddam's death  - and in addition, something had to be done in preparation for the situation likely to emerge in Saudi Arabia after the King's death. The climate of US opinion following 9-11 made it feasible to act now and WMDs provided an argument that was more palatable to the foreign policy establishment than mainatining openly that there is a need for a social revolution in the middle east.

P: I don’t think the US, under Bush, could get public support for a war of liberation from a standing start, let alone international support from other governments.

AL: The problem is why they insulted other governments and their peoples by taking the problem to the UN and then acting without UN authority instead of just bypassing the UN as would be normal.

The way I see it there would be far more public support for a war against tyranny than for "preventive war". However there would have far more opposition to a war against tyranny from the foreign policy establishment and Congress - especially as it would have required spelling out the hundreds of billions of dollars of costs  -  whereas simply asking for support to"disarm Saddam" left open the expectation that another Sunni/Baathist/military dictarorship would have been left to run the country at much less cost.

I have omitted the next few sentences as I find them incoherent. Hopefully a response to them is covered by my response to the following paragraph. If not, please clarify them.

P: Bush etc would have to admit to massive failure of former US policies in any such proposal, and this would expose the ruling class, and so educate the masses in a completely unacceptable direction. They had to jump on the democracy bandwagon, after the failure to find WMD, because there is nowhere else to go.

But it’s the same style as was ‘defending democracy’ in Vietnam they never admit to the reality of what that war was about, but rather talk of mistakes on their part, and quickly move the conversation on.

AL: Clearly Bush is reluctant to admit that the total failure of previous US policy in the middle east ("support reaction everywhere") has made it necessary to adopt the new policy ("drain the swamps"). Admitting it would result in people seeing the US as the "last superpower" in terminal decline and thus weaken them further. He is assisted in avoiding this by the pseudo-Left trumpeting on about how incredibly powerful the US is and how the current policy (of retreating from its previous support of reaction  everywhere)  is in fact "world conquest".

We need to find ways to get that across clearly.

But saying "They had to jump on the democracy bandwagon, after the failure to find WMD, because there is nowhere else to go." only obscures that issue. It suggests that "draining the swamps" is only their declaratory policy whereas I am saying it is their actual policy (while WMDs was just declaratory policy).

I'm not sure what you mean by the comparison with "defending democracy" in Vietnam. If you mean that the style in which they talk about democracy in Iraq is similar to the way they spoke about Vietnam - that reflects the continuity they want people to believe exists between their current strategy and their Cold War strategy (instead of openly admitting that they were opposed to democratic revolution before and forced to support it now.)

The actual content of the policy is of course opposite. By "democracy" in Vietnam they actually meant a fascist puppet regime.

P: Obviously, I have not thought all this out but I thought that I would just defend my position put when the war was imminent, that they are all pretty well ‘winging’ it.

I also think that this is becoming more apparent as this war goes along. They were never going to do what the anti-war brigade thought and install some sort of junta.

Anyway would love to hear further thoughts on all this.

AL: I find the suggestion that a superpower is "just winging it" quite fantastic. I may or may not have understood what policy they are following but the idea that they aren't really following a policy is ridiculous.

We certainly do need more discussion of what they are up to as it is not at all clear and certainly not widely understood.

Some recent documents intended to shed light on this include:

Madeleine Albright - Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster?

This indicates how little the Democrats understand the "drain the swamps" imperative and claims that if Gore had been President he would not have liberated Iraq.

James P Rubin - Stumbling Into War

This sheds interesting light on the perceptions of lower level officials who apparantly don't have much of a clue of what the policy makers are up to. According to Rubin they ought to have helped Saddam prove he had no WMDs so they could avoid a war!

Edward Luttwak provides the classic conservative "realist" position (establish another reactionary military dictatorship).

This helps understand what the Bush administration leadership is up against from the foreign policy establishment.

In much the same direction, although expressed with "liberal" phraseology is the International Crisis Group report on "Governing Iraq".

This provides lots of useful factual background and a litany of complaints from Sunni's that the traditional Sunni domination over the Shia dating back to the Ottoman empire should be preserved.

I'm still planning to write comments on these but have simply not been able to find the time and energy. Meanwhile I strongly recommend studying them and thinking about their implications.

In between winging it (unfortunate phrase I think, Pat) and perfect logic in planning ahead there is a whole possible spectrum of strategic and tactical competence in which we, participants in this discussion, are planning to situate Bush and co.

It could be that Bush has a good strategy but is tactically incompetent, not fully in control  - or that the policies are flawed by compromises between competing opinions of the inner circle

I agree that Bush has opted for a policy of draining the swamp, the only really viable strategy, completely reversing previous US policy, in order to prevent a repeat of 9/11 or worse

albert has acknowledged one serious tactical mistake by Bush and co in taking the WMD issue to the UN when it would have been more logical, in retrospect, to just go it alone and invade Iraq, if that is what the US had intended all along

It seems to me that the whole handling by the US of the Abbas / Arafat issue is another tactical mistake – it doesn’t make sense to expend energy to put Abbas in place to sideline Arafat and then sit back and watch him be underminded – the US should have been leaning on Israel much harder to relinquish settlements, biting the bullet and refusing aid if necessary – this would have be necessary to give Abbas some credibility, prevent the resurgence of Arafat and push the road map forward

That is not a hiccup, it is a serious policy failure

Given that the US has already made one serious tactical error on the WMD issue we need to seriously consider the possibility that error is part of an ongoing pattern

Why? Possible reasons include:

• Bush has been tactically out manoeuvred by Sharon – that Sharon’s goal is to discredit Bush with the now realistic aim of helping a more compliant Democrat regime coming to office in the US

• Bush is trapped in the historical inertia of the US vis a vis Israel – it is too difficult for him to be even handed with regard to the terrorism of Hamas on the one hand and the state terrorism of Israel on the other hand

• A camel is a horse designed by a committee – decisions made by the Bush inner circle are not based on pure logic but are the result of compromises made between the various players – such compromises we can surmise sometimes result in departure from the best possible policy to follow

I talked to pat on the phone about these ideas before writing them out so he can take the credit for the good ones and I'll take the blame for the bad ones, or vice versa

Analysing U.S Tactics

(by albert on 10/02/2003)

BK:  In between winging it (unfortunate phrase I think Pat) and perfect logic in planning ahead there is a whole possible spectrum of strategic and tactical competence in which we, participants in this discussion, are planning to situate Bush and co.

It could be that Bush has a good strategy but is tactically incompetent, not fully in control or that the policies are flawed by compromises between competing opinions of the inner circle

AL: The original issue I raised was why the US had vetoed an uncontroversial resolution opposing an Israeli threat to "remove" Arafat. My analysis was that the Israeli threat was just posturing - throwing a temper tantrum because their policies are in an impasse and that the US veto is an extravagent gesture of symbolic support for Israel of the sort likely to be made when about to take action against Israeli interests. That is a concrete analysis of a concrete question, which may be right or wrong but can and should be discussed by reference to other facts and interpretations.

Unfortunately the response above (and much of the further response below) is not a concrete analysis but a general statement that anything is possible. That does not help much. It is even less helpful when supposedly providing support for some other analysis.

 BK: I agree that Bush has opted for a policy of draining the swamp, the only really viable strategy, completely reversing previous US policy, in order to prevent a repeat of 9/11 or worse

 AL: Ok, that is a very important point of agreement (and of disagreement with most other "analysis"). Two other things seem to me to follow fairly naturally.

First, a reversal of US policy towards "Greater Israel" expansionism ought to be seen as a vital US national interest by the Bush administration since Israeli oppression of the Palestinians is a major factor assisting anti-US sentiment favorable to the terrorists and frustrating US efforts to "drain the swamp".

Second, the US does not wish to be seen as having had to reverse a failed previous policy in the middle east but prefers to present its retreat as an aggressive advance, even at the expense of greater unpopularity.

Are we agreed on those conclusions as well?

BK: albert has acknowledged one serious tactical mistake by Bush and co in taking the WMD issue to the UN when it would have been more logical, in retrospect, to just go it alone and invade Iraq, if that is what the US had intended all along

AL: Not exactly. I remain greatly puzzled by this and related aspects of US policy and have put forward various possible alternative explanations and pointed out problems with each of them.

BK: It seems to me that the whole handling by the US of the Abbas / Arafat issue is another tactical mistake – it doesn’t make sense to expend energy to put Abbas in place to sideline Arafat and then sit back and watch him be undermined–

AL: Abbas is one of the co-founders of Fateh with Arafat and was nominated as PM by Arafat. There may well be policy differences between them but I would not lightly accept that Abu Mazen is somebody "put in place" by the US "to sideline Arafat". At least some of that is part of US chest thumping. After refusing to negotiate the withdrawal of Israel from the West Bank and Gaza with Arafat the US wishes to emphasize that Arafat is the problem when the real situation is that they are now forced to negotiate that withdrawal. This has allowed Arafat and Ammar to play "good cop"/"bad cop".

BK: the US should have been leaning on Israel much harder to relinquish settlements, biting the bullet and refusing aid if necessary – this would have be necessary to give Abbas some credibility, prevent the resurgence of Arafat and push the road map forward

That is not a hiccup, it is a serious policy failure

AL: Well, one cannot go far wrong in concluding that the US should be leaning on Israel much harder. But the US aim is an "orderly retreat" that does not undermine the perception of US strength. From that point of view it is very important to them to avoid an open split with Israel except on terms where everyone agrees that there was no other option. A policy of giving Sharon enough rope to hang himself with and/or (together with Sharon) of underlining the necessity to take the next step, is consistent with that US interest.

My estimate that the current situation is a hiccup rather than a serious policy failure is due to the absence of a dramatic collapse in the road map negotiations. Sure Israel and Hamas etc are attacking each other. That does result in serious harm to civilians on both sides but it isn't anywhere near as dramatic as the situation would be if Israel and the Palestinian National Authority were attacking each other. The reality is that the road map ceasefire between them is holding and Israel is just demonstrating to the complete satisfaction of all factions among its own people and their supporters that its present policies are completely futile and lead nowhere.

That makes it easier, not harder, to take the next step. (Likewise there are similar demonstrations on the Palestinian side to Hamas etc).

This is the sort of thing I mean about Bush following Lincoln's approach of never taking a step until its necessity has become obvious.

BK: Given that the US has already made one serious tactical error on the WMD issue we need to seriously consider the possibility that error is part of an ongoing pattern

AL: All sorts of errors are possible. But the most obvious errors in this situation would be:

a) Allowing any of the factors mentioned below to get in the way of acknowledged fundamental US national interests that require a reasonable settlement with the Palestinians in order to "drain the swamps".

b) Raising expectations by undermining the whole basis of previous policy through forcing Sharon to accept the ultimate necessity of a Palestinian state (and speak of "occupation") while not following through. That could only put the US and the Bush administration in a dramatically worse position than if they had just let things fester.

BK: Why? Possible reasons include:

• Bush has been tactically out manoeuvred by Sharon – that Sharon’s goal is to discredit Bush with the now realistic aim of helping a more compliant Democrat regime coming to office in the US

AL: Actually the Democrats have been outmaneuvered by Bush. They have been denouncing Bush for being too pro-Sharon (with their allies in the Israeli Labor Party demanding more vigorous US pressure on Israel). Extravagent symbolic gestures like vetoing UN resolutions that are really opposed only by Sharon is an example of Bush out maneuvering Sharon, not the reverse.

BK: Bush is trapped in the historical inertia of the US vis a vis Israel – it is too difficult for him to be even handed with regard to the terrorism of Hamas on the one hand and the state terrorism of Israel on the other hand

AL:Certainly there is a very real problem of "historical inertia" that makes it difficult for Bush to move. My point is that Bush seems to be deliberately doing things like the symbolic veto (and the build up of Abbas as a "partner") that are calculated to make it easier to overcome that inertia.

BK: • A camel is a horse designed by a committee – decisions made by the Bush inner circle are not based on pure logic but are the result of compromises made between the various players – such compromises we can surmise sometimes result in departure from the best possible policy to follow

I talked to pat on the phone about these ideas before writing them out so he can take the credit for the good ones and I'll take the blame for the bad ones, or vice versa

AL: I'm inclined to be sceptical about analysis of internal divisions within the US executive. The "traditional" rivalry between Pentagon and State seems to me more like the usual role of a foreign service in representing "the rest of the world" (including adversaries) within government decision making (as described in "Yes Minister"). Whatever divisions actually exist within executive governments are generally kept tightly guarded secrets and it is therefore too difficult to base any analysis on them.

On the other hand US policy generally, and especially on Israel and Palestine is clearly greatly affected by the role of Congress as a "player" and the influence of the zionist lobby there. That's why I interpret events like the veto as part of the maneuvering to make Congressional disruption more difficult.